November 3

Rima Hussein (JHU)

Kant on Individuation and Spatial Objects

Abstract: In the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a quick argument against Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles. Kant believes that qualitatively similar objects and indiscernible objects can easily be held to be numerically distinct by reference to their location in space. At face value, there appear to be three dramatic issues with this view. First, reference to space itself fails for Leibniz as a means of individuation since spatial location is not a true predicate. Kant’s criticism would fail on grounds of grossly misunderstanding Leibniz’s views. Second, if we interpret Kant’s view to be an answer to the ancient problem of individuation, Kant would be left to claim that spatial location makes an object the object it is. This would mean that I would fail to be myself if I left this desk and walked into the kitchen. And third, this argument seems to fail obvious counterexamples like Max Black’s universe of two identical spheres. This counterexample puts significant pressure on the idea that spatial location even contributes to the discernibility of objects. In this talk, I contribute to an interpretation on which Kant’s reference to spatial location is an argument for the view that spatial location is the only means by which an objects identity with itself can be secured over time such that changes in the object can be made comprehensible. This is not a new view; what I provide is an argument to bolster this view: The deep problem of individuation, namely, the problem what makes an object different from any other possible objects, requires us to completely determinate all properties of the object. Black’s as well as Leibniz’s arguments presuppose the idea that indeterminacy is unacceptable. I show that if one were to endorse metaphysical indeterminacy, Black’s counterexample loses its force. There is an alternative option to interpreting the problem of individuation, namely to view Kant as in favor of a shallow interpretation of individuation. On that view, the problem of individuation only occurs in certain comparative context. How is this droplet different from a perfectly similar looking one? In the context of comparing appearances, reference to spatial location would be perfectly acceptable. This does not require Kant to endorse complete determination as a presupposition. In the last part of the talk, I investigate the hypothesis that Kant accepts a certain amount of indeterminacy for spatial objects.

Rima Hussein is a PhD Candidate at Johns Hopkins University with interests in the history of philosophy.

A recording of the session will be made available on the “Downloads” page for some time following the event.

(The “Downloads” page is password-protected, and the password is available to all members of the Spinoza and EMP Workshop email list.)