Feb. 21

Emanuele Costa (Vanderbilt)

Spinoza and Trope Theory

Abstract: Trope theory and Spinoza’s metaphysics apparently present two incompatible ontological landscapes. Spinoza assigns a strong metaphysical priority to a grounding substance and describes common objects as adjectival upon such substance. By contrast, several contemporary trope theories attempt to reduce all substances (both universal and particular) to bundles of individual properties. In this article, I motivate, defend, and develop a compatible reading of Spinozism and trope theories. This interpretation provides new reasons to take seriously some of the most controversial of Spinoza’s claims, such as its monism and its commitment to universal necessity. Moreover, my interpretation undermines some classical objections against trope theories, such as their unwarranted multiplication of metaphysical objects, and their commitment to a description of objects based on necessary sets of their properties.

Emanuele Costa is Visiting Scholar of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University.

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